The rules laid down by Arts. 594 to 601 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure being only intended to govern revindications which are incidental to expropriation proceedings, Art. 594 cannot be taken to derogate from the principle laid down by Art. 591 of the same Code, that no person can acquire from or through another person more rights than the latter was possessed of. The true owner of an immovable which has been seized and sold by auction, can, therefore, revindicate the said immovable even subsequently to the adjudication. (Sum. Trib. Esneh, 17 January 1903; No. 44, p. 36).

v. Lease, 2°.

v. Complicity, 1°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment, 10°, 13°); Resistance.

v. Distribution proceedings; Revocation of judgment (Petition for—), 2°.

v. Appeal (Time for—), 2°, 3°, 4°.

v. Judgment (Service of—), 1°; Appeal (Admissibility of—), 1°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 3°.

v. Revocation of judgment (Petition for—), 2°.

The owner of a wall bordering on an adjoining estate has the right to make apertures for light and air; but the adjoining owner preserves his right to set up buildings which obstruct these apertures even when the latter have existed for more than fifteen years. Such apertures do not come under Art. 39 C.C. which only applies to servitudes of view. (Sum. Trib. Musky, 1 April 1902; No. 97, p. 77).

v. Appeal (Annulment of proceedings).

v. Recidive, 1°.

v. Theft, 2°.

A mandara (reception room) in which a number of people are present is not a public place within the meaning of Art. 153 P.C. Consequently an insult offered in such circumstances is not punishable under Art. 281 P.C. but under Art. 346 of the same Code. (Sum. Trib. Guirgueh, 15 February 1903; No. 54, p. 48).

v. Pension.

v. Revocation of judgment (Petition for—), 1° III.

v. Revocation of judgment (Petition for—), 1° II.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment).

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure).

v. Revocation of judgment (Petition for), 2°.

v. Jurisdiction (Forum rei), 1°.

The decision given by a Tribunal of First Instance sitting in chambers on the opposition made to a taxing order is a true judgment; it may therefore be appealed against by application of the general principle of law that all judgments are open to appeal unless the law has specially decided otherwise. (App. 23 December 1902; No. 64, p. 55).

The law having laid down special rules of procedure for tender (C.C.C. Pr. Art. 685 follg.) proof by witnesses cannot be admitted. Such admission would moreover lead in certain cases such as the present to the evasion of the general rules by which proof by witnesses is regulated. (Trib. App. Assiout, 17 December 1901; No. 8, p. 4).

v. Police Supervision, 1°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 12°.

١ The keeper of a bathing establishment who fraudulently appropriates property entrusted to him by a person taking a bath in his establishment, comes within the class of persons mentioned by Art. 292 para. 4 P.C. and is punishable under that article and not under Art. 315 of the same Code. (Trib. App. Kena, 2 February 1903, No. 51, p. 47).

٢ The theft of cereals after their removal from the field to a gorn (threshing-floor) constitutes a theft punishable under article 300 of the Penal Code and not under article 295. (Sum. Trib. Sohag, 30 June 1902; No. 108, p. 86).

٣ v. Hard labour (Imprisonment with—).

The punishment for attempted theft is that immediately below the punishment provided for the completed offence (Arts. 11 and 302 P.C.) and not the minimum of such penalty. Consequently the penalty for attempt to steal growing crops accompanied by any of the circumstances mentioned by Art. 296 of the Penal Code must necessarily be less than eight days, the term of imprisonment for the completed offence being fixed by that article at from eight days to three months. (Cir. No. 9, 22 May 1902; No. 11, p. 4).

v. Theft, 2°.

v. Citation (Regularity).

v. Appeal (Time for—); Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 7°.

An Eshhad made before a Mehkemeh in Turkey by the owner of an immovable situated in Egypt to the effect that another person is the owner thereof constitutes, provided there is acceptance either express or tacit on the part of the latter, a deed capable of conveying ownership, and consequently is not established, as against third parties, unless transcribed in Egypt. (App. 23 December 1902; No. 104, p. 85).

v. Sale, 1°.

The prohibition of usurious interest is a matter of public policy, and it may therefore be proved by any method that sums stipulated in a lease are in reality of that nature, even if such proof has for effect to prove against the contents of a document or has reference to a sum exceeding P.T. 1000. (Trib. Sum. Tantah, 26 February 1903; No. 96, p. 77).

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment, 6°, 8°); Continuing offence.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 6° I, 8°.

v. Hard labour (Imprisonment with—); Police Supervision, 2°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 10°.

v. Preemption, 1°.