v. Incidental claim.

١ In calculating the term of police supervision undergone by an individual no period must be counted, during which he failed to comply with the conditions of the penalty. (Cass. 25 May 1901; No. 67, p. 61).

٢ It follows from the imperative language of paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Decree of July 13th, 1891, relative to vagabondage that police supervision is an obligatory and not discretionary measure in the case of persons sentenced for vagabondage. The expression "les uns et les autres" refers quite as much to the vagabonds dealt with in the first paragraph of this article as to those dealt with in the second. The letter and the spirit of the law are alike opposed to restricting the disposition to the vagabonds dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1. Such restriction would result in treating more severely, as regards police supervision, those whom the law has treated more leniently, as regards the principal penalty. (Cir. No. 13, 6 July 1902; No. 34, p. 25).

٣ v. Extenuating circumstances, 1°.

v. Prescription (Acquisitive), 2°.

v. Fruits, 2°; Prescription (Extinctive).

v. Fruits, 1°, 3°; Good faith, 1°.

v. Guardianship.

١ Prior to the promulgation of the Law on Preemption of 23 March 1901 a simple declaration by an intending preemptor of his intention to preempt, made within 15 days of the official notification of the sale, kept alive his rights, and he could not be deprived of such rights on the ground that he had not brought his action within any particular time. Nevertheless if, after the sale, a long period had elapsed during which he had had knowledge of the sale, without having declared his intention to preempt, he might be considered as having waived his rights, even though he had not been called on to make such declaration. Such knowledge may be presumed from the circumstances of the case; as for instance, from the fact that the preemptor and the purchaser are neighbours and relations; that the purchaser has managed the property as its owner; that the teklif has been transferred into his name; and that he has paid the taxes. (App. 19 November 1901; No. 27, p. 22).

٢ A neighbour is not deprived of his right to preempt, if, on the sale of property adjoining his own, a narrow strip of land between the property sold and that of the neighbour has been excluded solely for the purpose of depriving the neighbour of his right to preempt. (App. 6 January 1903; No. 72, p. 63).

٣ An intending preemptor does not forfeit his right to preempt by reason of his failure to declare his intention within fifteen days from his knowledge of the sale unless he knew the name of the purchaser, the price and other conditions of the sale. (App. 3 March 1903; No. 85, p. 71).

٤ v. Compromise, 1°; Forgery, 2°.

v. Forgery, 1°.

١ Acquisitive prescription is a defence of which any form of proof is admissible. In particular it may be proved by parol evidence. Further, this defence may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. (App. 16 December 1902; No. 61, p. 54).

٢ The nullity of a contract of sale of an immovable resulting from the want of capacity of the vendor cannot be covered by possession during five years. Such possession only covers the nullity resulting from the fact that the vendor was not the true owner of the immovable sold. Note.—By this judgment the Court seems also to lay down the rule that, prior to the Decree of the 19th of November 1896, concerning the Meglis Hasby, a contract made by an individual during the interval between the decision of the Meglis Hasby interdicting him and the ratification of the decision by the Cadi of the Mehkemeh was void, if the other party to the contract was aware of the interdicted person's true situation. (App. 20 January 1903; No. 74, p. 63).

٣ v. Servitude of view.

The action for the recovery of fruits brought by a proprietor against one who has possessed in bad faith is not barred by the quinquennial prescription of Art. 211 C.C. (Trib. App. Kena, 14 April 1903, No. 76, p. 64).

A payment on account interrupts extinctive prescription, since such payment is equivalent to an acknowledgment of the debt. (Sum. Trib. Dessouk, 29 October 1900; No. 10, p. 4).

Prescription is interrupted by a citation to appear even before a court which is incompetent, although the Egyptian Civil Code has not expressly dealt with this point. (Trib. App. Kena, 7 April 1903; No. 106, p. 86).

v. Continuing offence.

v. Lease, 2°.

v. Document (Private—Copies of—).

v. Appeal (Annulment of proceedings).

v. Cassation with order for new trial (Effects).

v. Document (Official).

v. Reconciliation (Procès-verbal of—).

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 7°.

Where a promissory note to order, which is an act of commerce in virtue of Art. 2 of the Commercial Code, is regularly indorsed, the ownership of such note is transferred to the indorsee. The indorsee holds his rights directly against the subscriber of the note and the latter cannot avail himself against the indorsee of grounds of defence, which he could have opposed to the indorser, as, for instance, that he has paid to the latter the amount of the note. (Sum. Trib. Beni-Souef, 12 May 1903; No. 98, p. 78).

v. Document (Private—Copies of—); Document (Private—Denial of authenticity of—).

v. Contract (Civil or Commercial); Gaming; Prescription (Acquisitive), 1°; Tender; Usury.

v. File (Order to).

v. Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals, 1°.

v. Document (Official—); Election (Validity of—).

v. Slander.

v. Bar regulations; Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 7°; Gaming; Usury.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 10°, 13°; Resistance.

v. Interdiction, 1°, I.

v. Cassation (Grounds), 5°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 2°, 11°.

v. Cassation (Grounds), 6°.