COURT OF CASSATION 27 April 1901. MM. Cassem Amin Bey (Pres.); de Hults, Youssef Chawki Bey, Coghlan, Ahmad Zeiwar Bey (JJ.); Muhammad Safwat Bey (State Rep.). MIKHAIL MAKAR v. STATE REPRESENTATIVE (I. P.C. Arts 89 follg.—II. C. Cr. Pr. Arts 155, 220 follg.—C.C.C. Pr. Art. 309.—III. C. Cr. Pr. Arts 220 follg.). I. Bribery—Attempted offence—Offer not specified—Intermediary. II. Composition of Court — Recusation — Impartiality. III. Operative part of judgment—Designation of offence. I. The crime of bribing a public official (Arts 89 follg. P.C.) is to be deemed completed when the gratification offered has been accepted by the official, and attempted when the offer has not been accepted. The making of an offer to "give a gratification" constitutes an attempt to bribe, even though the gratification has not been exhibited, nor its value or nature determined. An attempt to bribe may be committed by the instrumentality of a third person (Cf. Art. 92 P.C.) II. A judgment given by a Court irregularly composed is liable to Cassation. The fact however that the President of a Tribunal had forwarded to the Parquet a charge of attempted bribery, sent to him by one of the magistrates of his Tribunal whom it had been attempted to bribe, does not of itself render it improper for such President to preside at the hearing at which sentence for the attempted bribery is passed; for, having expressed no opinion on the case, there are no grounds for recusing him (1). III. It is not necessary that the designation of the offence punished should appear in the operative part of the judgment; it is sufficient if such designation is contained in the motives. (1) As regards the recusation of a judge in a criminal cause the courts have decided that the same rules must be applied as in civil proceedings (Cass. 16 November 1895, El Cada III, 62). Thus a judge has been held liable to recusation in the following cases; 1. If he sits to hear a case on appeal, after having tried the matter in first instance (Cass. 25 May 1895, El Cada, II, 276; 16 November 1895, El Cada III, 62; 11 December 1897, El Cada V, 66). 2. If he sits to hear a charge of giving false evidence, brought against a person whom he caused to be arrested for such offence at the hearing of a previous case (Cass. 31 December 1898, El Cada VI, 84). 3. Speaking generally, if he has taken any such step in the preliminary examination as allows his opinion on the case to appear (Cass. 31 December 1898, El Cada VI, 84; Cir. 21 May 1895, El Cada II, 194). As regards the question whether or not in these cases the judge ought under pain of nullity to recuse himself of his own motion, the judgment of the Court of Cassation of 25 May 1895 above quoted has decided the affirmative; see however contra Cass. 16 November 1895 (also quoted above).