The rules concerning the exercise of the profession of barrister are rules of public policy. A Court, therefore, is bound to declare void, even of its own motion, any fictitious assignment of claim made with the object of allowing the assignee to practise as a barrister in breach of the provisions relating to such practice. (Sum. Trib. Sohag, 21 March 1903; No. 110, p. 87).

v. Theft, 1°.

v. Sale by licitation.

v. Dieh.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 4°, 5°, 10°, 13°.

v. Lease (Cancellation of).

v. Appeal (Time for), 1°; Complicity; Continuing offence; False pretences; File (Order to—); Forgery, 1°; Judgment by default on opposition; Police supervision, 1°; Recidive, 1°; Res judicata, 1°.

١ 1° Where several persons are condemned by the same judgment a ground of cassation urged by one benefits the others, if the ground is common to all. The nullity of the judgment is such a common ground. Such a case does not come within the meaning of Art. 221 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Cass. 26 October 1901; No. 1, II, p. 1).

٢ 2° Where there are several persons condemned by the same judgment a ground of cassation urged by one benefits the others if such grounds are common to all. The nullity of the judgment or the fact that the act is not punishable by the law are such common grounds. (Cass. 2 November 1901; No. 3, II, p. 2).

٣ 3° When a judgment of conviction has been appealed against by the accused and confirmed in its entirety, the Parquet can have no interest in attacking the appeal judgment before the Court of Cassation on the ground that the appeal of the accused was out of time and therefore inadmissible. For, if the appeal judgment were quashed, the judgment of first instance, identical with it, would ipso facto be re-established. The Parquet's demand for cassation must, therefore, be rejected. (Cass. 13 December 1902; No. 40, p. 35).

٤ 4° Where several individuals have recourse to the Court of Cassation the grounds adopted by some of them can benefit the others only if these grounds are general in character, if the judgment attacked is final and if those who did not adopt them presented others which were formally admissible. (Cass. 10 January 1903; No. 79, p. 69.)

٥ 5° All nullities arising in first instance are covered by silence on appeal; the omission, therefore, to mention in the procès-verbal of the sitting of a Tribunal of First instance that the sitting was public does not constitute a nullity giving recourse to cassation, if the nullity has not been brought forward on appeal. (Cass. 10 January 1903; No. 99, II, p. 83.)

٦ 6° The question as to the state of mind of the condemned person, at the moment of the infraction, is not a ground of cassation, since the Court, in condemning him, has decided the question of his moral responsibility, and such decision is final. (Cass. 28 February 1903; No. 102, p. 85.)

١ 1° The mention in a judgment containing a sentence for forgery that the accused was in possession of the seal belonging to the victim and that he forged a document is not a sufficient indication of the means by which the forgery was committed. (Cass. 26 October 1901; No. 1, I, p. 1.)

٢ 2° The omission in a judgment of the date of the offence is a substantial ground of nullity. The date on which the information was lodged is not sufficient. (Cass. 2 November 1901; No. 3, I, p. 2.)

٣ 3° A judgment containing a sentence for obtaining property by false pretences, ('escroquerie' P. C. Art. 312) is liable to cassation for defective statement of grounds if it does not mention the fraudulent pretences made. (Cass. 1 March 1902; No. 4, p. 2.)

٤ 4° A judgment convicting an individual under Art. 219 of the Penal Code is liable to cassation for substantial nullity, if it fails to mention the fact that the blows resulted in an illness or incapacity for work of more than twenty days' duration. It is not sufficient to mention that the victim underwent medical treatment for more than twenty days as a result of the blows. (Cass. 17 May 1902; No. 24, p. 21.)

٥ 5° The mention in a judgment that blows were given is sufficient to exclude the application of Art. 346 of the Penal Code. Consequently, if a person, convicted as accomplice in the misdemeanour of assault and battery (Arts. 68, 220 P.C.), has recourse to the Court of Cassation on the ground that, in the absence of indication in the judgment of the gravity of the blows inflicted, Art. 346 might have been applied and that this article, dealing with a contravention, would not have admitted the charge of complicity, his demand for cassation must be rejected. (Cass. 17 May 1902; No. 37, III, p. 34).

٦ 6° I. In a judgment convicting an individual of the utterance of a forged document, the mention of the case in which the document was produced is sufficient indication of the date of its utterance. II. The mention that the forged document was produced in Court is a sufficient indication of the manner of its utterance. III. In a judgment convicting an individual of utterance of forgery the mention that the accused paid a sum of money, taking a receipt for the amount, and that he subsequently produced the same receipt with the figures changed, is a sufficient indication that he was aware of the false character of the document, even though the judgment does not explicitly state that he had such guilty knowledge. (Cass. 29 November 1902; No. 47, I, II, IV, p. 45).

٧ 7° The time allowed for appealing is based on considerations of public policy; a judgment, therefore, which admits an appeal in form must mention the date on which appeal was brought, or be liable to cassation for substantial nullity. (Cass. 6 December 1902; No. 48, p. 46).

٨ 8° A judgment containing a single sentence for forgery and for uttering a forgery and giving the date of the uttering, is not liable to cassation for omission of one of the elements of the offence on the ground that the date of the forgery itself is not stated. (Cass. 10 January 1903; No. 99, III, p. 83).

٩ 9° A judgment of conviction which does not mention the grounds on which it is based is liable to cassation for substantial nullity. (Cass. 17 January 1903; No. 82, p. 70).

١٠ 10° A judgment of conviction for outrage and blows under Arts. 125 and 126 P.C. which fails to mention the position held by the victim is liable to cassation for substantial nullity as omitting one of the elements of the offence; such mention is necessary, in order that it may be possible to ascertain whether the victim was or was not a Government official. (Cass. 17 January 1903; No. 88, p. 75).

١١ 11° I. A judgment on appeal which contains no mention of the grounds on which it is based and does not adopt those of the first instance judgment is liable to cassation for substantial nullity. II. It is not sufficient for a judgment to mention the provision of the decree under which the accused is convicted. The date of the decree must be specified either expressly or by reference to the first instance judgment in which the date is quoted. (Cass. 31 January 1903; No. 81, I. II., p. 70).

١٢ 12° When an article is composed of several paragraphs it is sufficient that the paragraph of which application is made should be quoted. The quotation of the whole article is not required on pain of nullity. (Cass. 14 February 1903; No. 101, I., p. 84).

١٣ 13° A judgment condemning a person for assaulting a Government official in the exercise of his duties need not under pain of substantial nullity specify the duties upon which he was engaged at the time of the assault. (Cass. 28 February 1903; No. 90, p. 76).

١ 1° A judgment which has not been deposited with its grounds at the registry within the time prescribed by Art. 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is liable to cassation for substantial nullity, such delay depriving, as it does, the person condemned of a portion of the time allowed him by the same article to take proceedings in cassation and deposit his conclusions. (Cass. 26 October 1901; No. 2, p. 2).

٢ 2° A judgment of the Court of Appeal convicting the accused of an attempt to rape, after his acquittal by the Tribunal of First Instance for an indecent assault with violence, and appeal by the State Representative, is not liable to cassation for substantial nullity; for the two crimes are similar in character and the only modification is in the intention attributed by the Court to the accused after an examination of the same facts as those upon which the judgment in first instance was founded. (Cass. 7 December 1901; No. 68, p. 61).

٣ 3° Where the Court in the course of the proceedings has made an inspection of places for the purpose of a supplementary investigation of the affair without notice thereof being served on the accused and without the accused having in fact been present at such investigation, the proceedings are null and void. The nullity is not covered by the silence of the accused with respect to the irregularity during the pleadings on the merits of the case, if it appears that he may not have had knowledge of the inspection. (Cass. 3 May 1902; No. 35, p. 33).

٤ 4° The recourse in cassation on the part of the accused based on the repeated adjournment of the delivery of judgment is inadmissible, if the adjournments were for the purpose of deliberation, since they may have been necessary in the interest of the accused. Moreover, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure declaring null and void a judgment delivered at a later sitting than the one immediately following the trial. (Cass. 10 May 1902; No. 36, p. 33).

٥ 5° A judgment of the Court of Cassation given without the civil claimant having been cited can only affect the penal conviction. Consequently, the Court of Appeal before whom the case is sent for fresh trial is not concerned with the question of the damages given to the civil claimant, since the judgment of the Court of Cassation leaves untouched this part of the judgment. If the Court of Appeal includes this question in its judgment, its judgment is liable to cassation for substantial nullity. (Cass. 31 May 1902; No. 38, p. 34).

٦ 6° The omission of the Court to decide on the demand of the accused for an inquiry in order to prove his innocence of the act alleged does not render the judgment liable to cassation, the authorization of the Court not being necessary to enable an accused to prove his innocence. (Cass. 29 November 1902; No. 47, III, p. 45).

٧ 7° The procès-verbal of a sitting which omits to state that the accused was asked his name and address, does not render the judgment liable to cassation for substantial nullity. (Cass. 10 January 1903; No. 99, I, p. 83).

٨ 8° One of the judges giving judgment in a civil action ordering the withdrawal of a false document, may sit subsequently in a penal action and decide whether or not the same document is a forgery punished by law, as in such a case the object of the two judgments is different. (Cass. 10 January 1903; No. 99, IV, p. 83).

٩ 9° A judgment given on appeal is liable to cassation for substantial nullity which is founded on evidence which has been heard neither by the Tribunal of First Instance nor by the Tribunal judging the appeal when there was no reason why such evidence should not be heard. (Cass. 17 January 1903; No. 80, p. 70).

١٠ 10° The oath required to be taken by doctors and all persons of technical qualifications, such as expert chemists, before the examining magistrate to give their evidence truly and conscientiously, is laid down under penalty of substantial nullity of the procedure giving recourse to cassation. (Cass. 31 January 1903; No. 100, p. 84).

١١ 11° The fact that a person prosecuted as principal has been condemned as accomplice, when the change in qualification by the Court has in no way prejudiced the right of defence does not constitute a ground of nullity. (Cass. 14 February 1903; No. 101, II, p. 84).

١ 1° When the Court of Cassation quashes a judgment of the Court of Appeal and orders a new trial, the proceedings before the Court as well as its judgment are quashed. Consequently, the judgment of the new chamber of the Court of Appeal, which is based on a supplementary inquiry ordered by the first chamber on the occasion of the previous proceedings on appeal, is liable to cassation for substantial nullity. (Cass. 31 January 1903; No. 89, p. 75).

٢ 2° v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 5°.

v. Theft, 2°; Theft (Attempt).