٢ By virtue of Art. 28 O. D. and Art. 143 C. C. the Native Courts have power to set aside a transaction by which a person, subsequently to the promulgation of the Native Codes, has founded a Wakf so as to defeat the rights of his creditors. And since laws relating to procedure are retrospective the Native Courts have also jurisdiction to try an action in which creditors claim to set aside a Wakf founded under similar conditions prior to the publication of the said Codes. In this latter case, the Court will set aside the transaction, if according to the law in force at the time of such transaction a Wakf founded so as to defeat creditors could on that ground be set aside. The Muhammadan Law, according to the opinion generally accepted, allows that a Wakf founded under such conditions may be set aside to an extent proportional to the amount of the debt.

٣ The fact that a Court has no jurisdiction to try the claim against a surety brought in as third party, in no way affects its jurisdiction as regards the principal claim. In particular, when the parties to the principal claim are all natives, and one of them brings in as third party a surety who is a foreigner, the jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted as regards the principal claim, but only as regards the claim against the surety.

٤ When a creditor sues one of the heirs of his deceased debtor for payment by such heir of his proportionate part of the debt, if the whole original debt exceeded 10,000 P.T. and the defendant disputes the existence of such original debt, the jurisdiction of the Summary Court is ousted, even though the amount claimed in the action does not exceed 10,000 P.T. For the action concerns a "part" of a disputed debt, within the meaning of Art. 30 C. C. C. Pr., and such disputed debt exceeds the limits of jurisdiction of a Summary Court. The rule, however, is different, and the Summary Court has jurisdiction, if, by reason of payments previously made, the amount remaining due on the original debt no longer exceeds 10,000 P.T.; since in this case the sum in question is a "balance" and not a "part" of a disputed debt, within the meaning of the article above referred to.

١ Since the legislature has established certain excuses in law, and has provided a reduced punishment, for cases where such excuses are proved, this reduced punishment, of which the limits are thus fixed by the law, is a "penalty provided by law." When therefore a person under fifteen years of age is prosecuted for misdemeanour, the penalty which determines what Court has jurisdiction to hear the case on appeal brought by the State Representative (Art. 175, note, C.Cr.Pr.) [Decree 26 June, 1895], is the reduced penalty applicable under Art. 62 P.C. The fact that the existence of the excuse in law may eventually be disproved is not a reason for bringing the matter before the Court which would have jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the absence of such excuse; for in deciding before what Court an action is to be brought, the facts of the case are to be considered as they appear before the hearing is commenced, without prejudice however to the duty of the Court to decline jurisdiction subsequently if necessary.

٢ Under C. Cr. Pr. Art. 171, a Criminal Court has, in the case of an acquittal, a general power of considering the claim for damages made by the person intervening as civil plaintiff, as well as that of the person acquitted. But the claim of such civil plaintiff can only be considered, if the act which caused him prejudice appeared bona fide to constitute a criminal offence (the object of the institution of criminal proceedings not being merely to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts), and provided also that the determination of the existence or amount of prejudice would not entail lengthy proceedings.

٣ A Criminal Court has no jurisdiction, in the case of an acquittal, to decide upon a claim for damages of a purely civil character.

٤ A Criminal Court has jurisdiction to decide upon the existence of a contract, whenever the proof of such contract is necessary to establish the criminal charge. But parol evidence is admissible in those circumstances alone in which it would be admissible before a Civil Court. When therefore a person, prosecuted under Art. 315 P. C. for fraudulent conversion as bailee of a document of title relating to a sum exceeding 1,000 P.T., disputes the existence of the bailment, parol evidence cannot be adduced on this point unless such a course would be permissible before a Civil Court. The fact that the bailee is the husband of the bailor's sister, does not of itself form such an obstacle to obtaining documentary evidence as is referred to in Art. 215 C. C.

٥ The offence of bringing a false charge, contained in a written document, is not completed until such document reaches the representative of the judicial or administrative authority. Consequently the Court within whose district the residence of such representative, where he received the document addressed to him, is situated, has jurisdiction to try the case, as being the Court of the place where the offence was committed.

٦ According to Art. 173 C. Cr. Pr. a Correctional Tribunal, before which a prosecution for misdemeanour is pending, is bound to decline jurisdiction, whenever there is a primâ-facie case of crime. Such a Tribunal, when once it has declared that the case is primâ-facie one of crime, has no jurisdiction to investigate the merits. Such jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the Criminal Court, in virtue of Arts. 210 follg. C. Cr. Pr.

٧ In the case of a person under 15 years of age accused of misdemeanour, the reduced penalty alluded to in Art. 62 P. C. is the "penalty provided by the law." within the meaning of the Decree of 26 June 1895 (see Art. 175, note C. C. Pr.). The appeal, therefore, of the State Representative in such a case is to be brought before the Court of Appeal only when the maximum penalty which can thus be applied exceeds one year's imprisonment.

٨ Under Art. 171 C. Cr. Pr. a Correctional Tribunal has jurisdiction, even when the accused is acquitted, to decide upon the claim for damages brought by the person intervening as civil claimant (partie civile). But this jurisdiction should be declined: a) If the act which formed the subject of the prosecution did not appear bona fide to constitute a legal offence, the sole object of the civil claimant being to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. b) If the existence of prejudice cannot be proved or the damages assessed without lengthy proceedings.

Renunciation of the rights established by a judgment is not allowed if the interests of the other party are thereby prejudiced. A party therefore in whose favour a judgment has been pronounced, but who is condemned in costs, is debarred from renouncing the right he has acquired, if, on appealing against the decision as to costs, the judgment in first instance is confirmed. (App. 4 December 1902; No. 59, II, p. 54.)

v. Complicity, 1°, 2°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 3°.

v. Document (Private — Denial of authenticity of—).

v. Appeal (Admissibility of—), 1°.

v. Prescription (Acquisitive).

v. Promissory note to order.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 4°.

v. Seizure of immovable property.

v. Forgery, 1°.

v. Expropriation (Judgment of—).

v. Appeal (Annulment of proceedings).

v. Recidive, 3°.

v. Oath (Decisive), 1°.

١ 1° The party who serves a judgment must not therefore be presumed to acquiesce in such judgment. Consequently, the party, who, having obtained a judgment in part favourable, serves it on the other party, does not on that account forfeit his right to appeal against the judgment for the part which is unfavourable to him. (Trib. App. Zagazig, 4 March 1902; No. 66, I, p. 56).

٢ 2° If a person is ordered by the Court to render an account by a certain date and after that date to pay a specified sum of money per day until the account is rendered, his appeal against the latter part of the judgment will be rejected for lack of interest, since it lies within the power of the Tribunal of First Instance to exempt the losing party from the payment of the above-mentioned sums of money on his showing good and sufficient cause for delay. (App. 27 November 1902; No. 57, p. 53).

٣ 3° — v. Reconciliation (Procès-verbal of—); Taxing order.

The setting aside of appeal proceedings (C.C.C.Pr. 124) involves the setting aside of the notice of appeal; it follows, therefore, that the appellant can only serve a second notice of appeal, if the time for appealing has not yet expired. (Trib. App. Assiout, 7 January 1902; No. 41 I, p. 35.)

v. Recidive, 2°.

v. Incidental claim.

١ 1° If the last day of the time allowed for appeal from a criminal judgment falls on a holiday the appeal may be made on the day following. (Cass. 13 June 1903; No. 103, p. 85).

٢ 2° A notice of appeal may be held to have been served out of time and the appeal in consequence rejected in form, even though no document can be found in the dossier determining the exact date of the service of the judgment appealed against, if it can with certainty be shown from the proceedings that the notice of appeal was in fact out of time. In particular, if, after the setting aside of the proceedings on appeal, the legal limit of time has elapsed between the setting aside and the service of a second notice of appeal, it is clear that the latter is out of time, the service of the judgment having necessarily preceded the setting aside of the appeal proceedings. (Trib. Assiout, 7 January 1902; No. 41, II, p. 35).

٣ 3° The time allowed for appeal begins to run from the date of the service of the judgment as against the party on whom the judgment is served but not as against the party serving it. (Trib. App. Zagazig, 4 March 1902; No. 66, II, p. 56).

٤ 4° The general principles of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure are applicable in criminal cases in the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The service, therefore, of a criminal judgment by default upon the father of the condemned person during the latter's absence from their common domicile is valid, and consequently his appeal after the expiration of the time allowed by law should be rejected. (Trib. App. Kena, 30 June 1902; No. 75, p. 64).

٥ 5° v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 7°; Retroactive effect of laws.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 4°, 5°, 10°, 13°; Complicity 2°.

v. Bar regulations.

v. Juristic personality.

v. Theft (Attempt).