—Revocation of judgment—Untruthful statement: v. Judgment, Revocation of, 59.

—Alien civil claimant—Public action—Jurisdiction; v. Jurisdiction of native tribunals, Restrictions on, 65.

—Action on civil contract—Jurisdiction—Defendant's domicile; v. Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals inter se, 62.

—Election of—Waiver—Effect on waiver of appeal: v. Appeal, 11.

—Local subject—Appointment without consent of Egyptian Government—Jurisdiction: v. Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals, Restriction on, 71.

—Possessory action—Conditions: v. Possessory action, 89.

٢٠ 20. —Elements—Nature of possession.—To constitute embezzlement under art. 296 there must exist one of the contracts therein enumerated. If an employee of a railway company, of whom it is no part of the duty to receive payment of money, takes a sum from another employee who had fraudulently obtained it from a passenger, he is, therefore, not punishable under that article. (Trib. App. Alexandria, 17 April 1907; No. 67, p. 48.)

—Injury to servant—Servant's own negligence: v. Master and Servant, 83.

٢١ 21. —Admission.—In a previous action the respondents had sought to recover from the appellant the possession and arrears of rent of land which they alleged the appellant held from them under a lease. The respondents failed to prove the lease and their action was dismissed. In the present action the respondents claimed payment of hikr which they alleged to be due in respect of the same land. In support of their claim they submitted a document put in during the former action, which contained a statement, then denied by the respondents, to the effect that the appellant held not under a lease but under a contract of hikr. Held, on appeal, that the document referred to did not constitute an admission sufficient of itself to prove the respondents' claim, and that, as no other evidence that hikr was due had been submitted by the respondents, their action should be dismissed. (Trib. App. Cairo, 23 April 1907; No. 102, p. 75.)

٢٢ 22. —Contract between commercial and non-commercial parties.—Where a contract is civil in regard to one of the parties and commercial in regard to the other, the former party is at liberty to prove his discharge therefrom by the methods of proof admissible in commercial causes. (Trib. App. Alexandria, 11 April 1907; No. 78, p. 59.)

٢٣ 23. —Debt exceeding L.E. 10—Proof of part payment under L.E. 10.—Where a debt of more than P.T. 1000 is evidenced by writing, the debtor cannot call witnesses to prove his partial discharge by the payment of a lesser sum than P.T. 1000 unless he establishes the existence of one of the exceptional circumstances exempting him from the necessity of written proof, e.g. the accidental loss of the document evidencing such discharge. (Sum. Trib. Minia-El-Kamh, 23 Dec. 1906; No. 22, p. 12.)

٢٤ 24. —Decisive oath—Modification equivalent to refusal.—The decisive oath must be taken in the same terms in which it is tendered. Any alteration of its terms may be deemed to amount to a refusal of the oath. Hence, where, in the form of oath tendered to one of the parties, he was asked to swear that he had paid P.T. 120, but, at its administration, he swore that he had paid P.T. 75 only, it was held that this modification constituted a refusal of the oath. (Sum. Trib. Luxor, 25 March 1907; No. 71, p. 49.)

٢٥ 25. —Written contract—Proof of simulation.—The simulation of a contract evidenced by writing can only be established between the parties by writing. (App. 1 Jan. 1907; No. 99, p. 74.)

V. Procedure, criminal, 107, 110-112.

—Abatement of price for deficiency—Condition of sale—Notice: v. Sale 121.

—Judgment by default—Opposition: v. Judgment by default, 54.

—Revindication—Appeal—Time limit: v. Appeal, 4.

—Revindication after adjudication—Owner's right of action: v. Revindication, 120.

—Administrative seizure—Notice of execution—Service; v. Seizure, administrative, 123.

—Civil judgment by default—Execution against surety—Time limit: v. Judgment by default, 53.

—Civil judgment by default—Peremption—Instructions to execute: v. Judgment by default, 57.

—Executory formula omitted—Power of court to rectify: v. Judgment, 51.

—Judgment of Mehkemeh—Administrative authorities—Jurisdiction; v. Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals, Restrictions on, 74.

—Judgment of Mehkemeh—Irregular execution—Claims arising from—Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals, Restrictions on, 75.

٢٦ 26. —Judgment of Mehkemeh—Alimony.—The judgment of a Mehkemeh ordering payment of alimony to a wife is enforceable by execution until the same Mehkemeh has, by a subsequent judgment, ordered payment to cease. It follows that, in default of such subsequent judgment, the administrative authorities are not liable in damages for having continued to levy execution, notwithstanding a notice served on them by the debtor to the effect that, as a consequence of his divorce, alimony had ceased to be payable. (Trib. App. Cairo, 26 March 1907; No. 56, p. 36.)

—Comparison of documents—Absence of accused: v. Procedure, Criminal, 107.

—Expropriation for public utility—Experts' proceedings—Parties not notified; v. Expropriation for public utility, 27.

٢٧ 27. —Irregularity of procedure—Damages.—It follows from art. 12, Decree of 17 February 1906, and from art. 226 ff. C.C.C.Pr., (from which the said art. 12 is a merely partial derogation), that experts' proceedings carried out without the expert having previously notified the parties concerned, are void. The provision of art. 20 of the said Decree, to the effect that the proceedings shall become final if they have not been impugned within thirty days, does not deprive unnotified parties of their right to have the proceedings declared void, since that article applies only to experts' proceedings which have been lawfully accomplished, and is inapplicable when the proceedings are to be deemed entirely nugatory. The deposit of the price, after experts' proceedings which are void, cannot be deemed equivalent to payment carrying with it a complete discharge as against an expropriated party, within the meaning of art. 28, Decree 17 February 1896. The expropriating party can, however, after he has deposited the price, and, by virtue of arts. 18 and 19 of the said Decree, proceed to occupy the land, the Courts having no jurisdiction (O.D. art. 15) to prevent the carrying out of an act of an administrative character. But the Courts can, in pursuance of the said art. 15, and by applying the rule that no person shall be entitled to make an unjust profit to the detriment of another, entertain the claim of the expropriated owner to have another expert appointed for the purpose of fixing the price which should be paid. (Trib. Zagazig, 17 March 1907; No. 68, p. 48.)

—Execution on immovables—Abatement of price for deficiency—Condition of sale; v. Sale, 121.

—Execution on immovables—Judgment by default—Opposition: v. Judgment by default, 54.

—Execution on immovables—Revindication—Appeal—Time limit: v. Appeal, 4.

—Execution on immovables—Revindication after adjudication—Owner's right of action: v. Revindication, 120.

٢٨ 28. —“Fraudulent device”—Clairvoyant.—It appeared that the accused, a reputed clairvoyant, had been consulted by the civil claimant with a view to obtaining his advice for the purpose of speculation on the cotton market. The accused had thereupon agreed, in consideration of his receiving a third of the profits, to give the civil claimant advice based on his occult knowledge of the future fluctuations of the market. The predictions of the accused had proved correct and the civil claimant, having thereby realised considerable profits, had paid the accused the share agreed upon. He had, however, lost by subsequent speculation and laid the present information. The accused was convicted in first instance, but acquitted on appeal. Held, that it does not appear from the judgment of acquittal that the losses sustained by the civil claimant were the result of the advice given him by the accused. The question for the Court is therefore confined to the transactions prior to such losses. The accused led the civil claimant to believe that he had an occult power of prediction, but, so far as concerns the civil claimant, if it be supposed that the advice was, in reality, based on practical acquaintance with the cotton market, this superstitious belief is immaterial. The device imputed to the accused is, in fact, merely that he foretold future events correctly. The acquittal must therefore be affirmed. (Cass. 25 Feb. 1907; No. 53, p. 35.)

٢٩ 29. —“Fraudulent device”—Sarraf—Use of official position.—A sarraf or tax collector, by falsely pretending to a person who had inherited certain property that succession duty (rasm-el-ailoula) was due in respect thereof, obtained payment from him of L.E. 12. Held, that a mere untruthful statement, unaccompanied by an overt act or trick intended to accredit or support it, does not amount to a “fraudulent device” within the meaning of P.C. art. 293, § 2, but that “device” is constituted by the fact that the person making the false statement has availed himself of his possession of a certain office or capacity for the purpose of inducing a belief in its truth. (Trib. App. Zagazig, 4 March 1907; No. 63, p. 47.)

—What constitutes: v. Public action, 113.

—Prescription—“Dies a quo”; v. Prescription of public action, 101.

٣٠ 30. —False certificate of service of process—Nullity of pretended service.—It appeared that the accused had been appointed in pursuance of art. 65, Decree of 14 February 1884 (Judicial Organisation), for the purpose of serving citations in criminal causes. Having been ordered to serve a judgment by default and also a summons, he had neglected to do so, but had nevertheless falsely made a record of their service. He was prosecuted under art. 181 P.C. for forgery. Held, that, as the accused had no authority under the said decree to serve processes other than citations, the service by him of the judgment by default would have been void, and that since arts. 12, 13 C.C.C.Pr. had not been complied with, the summons was also void; the falsification of a void instrument does not amount to forgery because it entails no loss, hence the false record of service made by the accused is not punishable and the charge must be dismissed. (Trib. Tanta, 28 March 1907; No. 114, p. 83.)

٣١ 31. —Personation—Submission to legal proceedings.—A person who, giving a false name, accepts service of and signs a writ of summons, and who subsequently appears at the hearing and suffers judgment under such name, is punishable under art. 180 P.C. (Cass. 9 Feb. 1907; No. 108, I, p. 81.)

٣٢ 32. —Public documents—Daftar El Ahwal.—The daily register (“Daftar el Ahwal”) is a public document within the meaning of art. 179 P.C. (Cass. 9 June 1906; No. 24, p. 17.)

—Preemptor's right to; v. Preemption, 93.