v. Cassation (Admissibility), 3°.

v. Execution, 1°.

v. Appeal (Parquet).

v. Interlocutory judgment, 1°, 3°, 4°.

١ 1° The jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the status of the parties at the time the action is brought. Entry into the Muhammadan faith by a Copt, against whom an action has been brought before the Patriarch, does not oust the jurisdiction of the latter, when all the circumstances of the case show that this change of status is merely intended as a means of escape from such jurisdiction. (App. 21 April 1904; No. 15, p. 10.)

٢ 2° Where an action is brought to recover a sum of money forming part of a debt of which the defendant denies the existence, the jurisdiction is determined by the amount of the whole sum and not by that of the part claimed by the plaintiff. (Sum. Trib. Assouan, 21 December 1904; No. 57, II, p. 36.)

٣ 3° The value of immovable property involved in a suit is for the purpose of limiting the jurisdiction determined by a calculation based upon the amount of the tax due to the State in respect thereof. In the event of no tax being due, the Court will appoint an expert for the purpose of fixing its value. If, on the contrary, the immovable is assessed, the Court may not go behind the valuation based upon an existing tax by nominating an expert to ascertain whether such valuation be correct or not. (Sum. Trib. Mina El Kamh, 4 January 1905; No. 58, p. 36.)

٤ 4° v. Jurisdiction of Civil Tribunals; Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal; Jurisdiction of Criminal Tribunals; Jurisdiction of Markaz Tribunals; Jurisdiction of Native Tribunals; Jurisdiction of Summary Tribunals; Jurisdiction ratione loci; Receiver (Application for appointment of—).

The object of making election of domicile, in a contract, is to attribute jurisdiction to the Courts of the place designated by the parties for the trial of disputed questions arising out of its performance. Such election must be made in unambiguous terms and is not to be inferred from a clause merely indicating the place of payment; this being inserted in view only of the amicable performance of the contract. (Sum. Trib. Assouan, 24 March 1904; No. 55, I, p. 35.)

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 6°.

The Courts enumerated by the Decree of 18 May 1892 have sole jurisdiction for the trial of causes in which natives sue the Government, either singly, or together with one, or more, co-defendants. (Sum. Trib. Assouan, 24 March 1904; No. 55, II, p. 35.)

The Court of appeal is empowered to modify the qualification of the offence, provided, however, that, in so doing it does not alter its nature as judged in first instance. (Cass. 25 February 1905; No. 84, p. 65.)

١ 1° The power given to the judge, when ordering an acquittal, to determine the damages which the parties can claim from one another, is not intended to enable a civil action to be brought before a criminal court merely because such a course might be more favourable to the claimant. Consequently the judge has power when acquitting, to declare the civil action inadmissible if he thinks that the principal issue in the criminal proceedings is purely civil, or that it requires special proceedings for its proof. (Sum. Trib. Damanhour, 23 May 1904; No. 78, II, p. 55.)

٢ 2° The terms "judge" "judge of first instance" and "judge of appeal" have a general meaning and are equivalent to "Tribunal" or "Court" whatever may be the number of judges sitting. "Judge" in Art. 50 P.C. is accordingly to be taken in a general sense. In principle, criminal penalties can only be pronounced by courts having criminal jurisdiction. An offence is a crime, misdemeanour, or police offence, according as the law makes it punishable by one of the penalties applicable to these three classes respectively. Although the penalty of penal servitude provided by Art. 50 P.C. is not obligatory, the judge having the option of inflicting this penalty or imprisonment, such option can only be exercised by a judge having criminal jurisdiction, that is, by the criminal Court. (App. 12 June 1904; No. 17, p. 10.)

٣ 3° Although the antecedent is not an element of the offence, yet the penalty entailed in consequence of its existence affects the jurisdiction on the analogy of Art. 179 C.Cr. Pr. where the appellate jurisdiction is affected by the sentence given. Moreover the law defines crimes as acts punishable by (inter alia) penal servitude for a term, and the court of first instance has jurisdiction in such cases, so that Art. 50 P.C. allows the infliction of a penalty which it is not in the power of a summary judge to give. "Judge" in Art. 50 P.C. should be understood in its general sense of "Tribunal" or "court," whatever the number of judges therein. (App. 3 July 1904; No. 18, p. 11.)

٤ 4° Criminal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction, except in certain cases, for the trial of questions incidental to the principal issue before them. An accused person cannot, therefore, pending the prosecution, bring an action before the civil court for the purpose of obtaining judgment upon a question which forms part of his defence to the criminal charge. The urgency of such question does not affect this rule. (Sum. Trib. Tel El Barud, 7 August 1904; No. 70, p. 48.)

٥ 5° The case of a person accused of theft, with six previous convictions for that offence, including a sentence to a year's imprisonment, must be considered as a crime, and the Summary court is incompetent to deal therewith. (App. 6 October 1904; No. 19, p. 11.)

The offence of unlawfully killing a sheep is punishable, not under Art. 312 but under Art. 310 P.C., a sheep not being a domestic animal. The Markaz Tribunals have consequently no jurisdiction to deal with the case. (Markaz Trib. of Naga Hamadi, 30 May 1905; No. 107, p. 77.)

١ 1° In order that a local subject may be treated as a foreigner from the point of view of the jurisdiction of the Native Tribunals, it is not sufficient that he should produce a consular certificate stating that he enjoys foreign protection. He should prove that the Government has consented to his change of nationality, or at any rate, that the Government has recognised that he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Native Tribunals. (App. 13 April 1905; No. 90, p. 67.)

٢ 2° Art. 7 of the Decree of 22 February 1894, exempting the State from all liability for any damage resulting from the steps taken by the Irrigation Department, is not applicable in case of damage caused by acts which are contrary to law and equity, or which infringe upon private rights when such acts are not necessary in the public interest. The Native Courts, having jurisdiction to deal with all actions which seek to make the State liable for executive acts done in violation of the law and decrees, can decide any claim for indemnity by reason of the violation of the law relating to dykes and canals. (App. 16 May 1905; No. 113, II, p. 87.)

١ 1° The Summary Tribunal has Jurisdiction for the trial of incidents of an urgent nature relating to the execution of a judgment. Since the law has not laid down any rule whereby the urgency of such incidents may be determined, the judge is free to appreciate the circumstances of each case and to hold it to be urgent or not as he, in the exercise of his discretion, may deem fit. The fact that it is sought to execute the judgment against a person who was not a party to the suit and the possibility that immediate execution may effect irreparable injury, are circumstances amounting to urgency, giving jurisdiction to the Summary Tribunal, and affording ground for an order to stay execution. (Sum. Trib. Sohag, 23 July 1902; No. 54, p. 35.)

٢ 2° The summary court has no jurisdiction to try the case of a person accused of abuse of confidence when he has been previously convicted and sentenced on two occasions to a year's imprisonment. (Cass. 21 January 1905; No. 50, I, p. 34.)

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 3°, 6°, 10°.

v. Recruiting law.

v. Appeal (Amount of claim), 1°, 2°; Pre-emption, 1°.

The conditions necessary for lawful defence are: (1) that no more force should be employed than is required to repel the act of aggression, and (3) that such act should constitute one of the offences mentioned in Art. 210 P.C. Lawful defence can be successfully pleaded to a charge of assault on a person who, having endeavoured to intrude into apartments reserved for women and having refused to leave when duly ordered to do so, had to be expelled by force. (Cass. 4 March 1905; No. 73, p. 53.)

١ 1° The principal landlord has a privilege over the crops and movables of the sub-lessee, but the extent of his right differs according as sub-letting is allowed or prohibited. In the former case, the right is limited to the amount of the rent of the sub-lease, if unpaid, or such part thereof as remains unpaid at the time that seizure is effected. This results from the landlord's right to proceed directly against the sub-lessee. In the latter alternative the landlord's privilege extends to the amount of the original rent, and its exercise cannot be affected by any payment from the sub-lessee to the principal lessee, the second lease having no existence so far as the original landlord is concerned. (Sum. Trib. Naga Hamadi, 11 June 1904; No. 79, p. 55.)

٢ 2° v. Wakf, 1°.

v. Continuing contravention.

v. Appeal (Time for—).

v. Contract (Capacity).

v. False charge, 1°.

The reason for visiting the offence of maliciously wounding a beast of burden with a severer penalty when committed at night is that the darkness affords facilities for committing the act and for the escape of the offender. Night is in this case to be taken to mean actual darkness. The offence is consequently not aggravated through being committed by night, if, although it was committed after sunset, the darkness was not, in fact, of such intensity as to facilitate the perpetration of the offence or to increase the difficulty of arresting the culprit. (App. 30 November 1904; No. 89, p. 67.)

v. Prescription (Acquisitive).

Payment of a debt to a person who falsely represents himself as agent of the creditor does not discharge the debtor, since he might have required production of an official copy of the alleged mandate to receive payment. Payment so made is, as regards the creditor, "Res inter alios acta," but the debtor may recover from the person guilty of the misrepresentation. (Trib. App. Kena, 12 May 1903; No. 53, II, p. 35.)

When the sum involved exceeds P.T. 1,000, mandate must be proved by documentary evidence. But where the Cadi, acting in his notarial capacity, draws up a deed of conveyance, a statement which he has set out in accordance with the testimony of witnesses to the effect that one of the parties to the deed is mandatary of a third person, is not admissible as such evidence, since the Cadi is not responsible for the truth of the testimony. (Trib. App. Cairo, 7 March 1905; No. 67, I, p. 47.)

Where a person acting on behalf of another, but without his authority purchases land and subsequently sells it, that other may, particularly when no connection exists between the two transactions, ratify the purchase while repudiating the sale. (Trib. App. Cairo, 7 March 1905; No. 67, II, p. 47.)

v. Jurisdiction of Markaz Tribunals.

v. Cassation (Misapplication of the law).

v. Recruiting law.