Renunciation of the rights established by a judgment is not allowed if the interests of the other party are thereby prejudiced. A party therefore in whose favour a judgment has been pronounced, but who is condemned in costs, is debarred from renouncing the right he has acquired, if, on appealing against the decision as to costs, the judgment in first instance is confirmed. (App. 4 December 1902; No. 59, II, p. 54.)

v. Complicity, 1°, 2°.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 3°.

v. Document (Private — Denial of authenticity of—).

v. Appeal (Admissibility of—), 1°.

v. Prescription (Acquisitive).

v. Promissory note to order.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of procedure), 4°.

v. Seizure of immovable property.

v. Forgery, 1°.

v. Expropriation (Judgment of—).

v. Appeal (Annulment of proceedings).

v. Recidive, 3°.

v. Oath (Decisive), 1°.

١ 1° The party who serves a judgment must not therefore be presumed to acquiesce in such judgment. Consequently, the party, who, having obtained a judgment in part favourable, serves it on the other party, does not on that account forfeit his right to appeal against the judgment for the part which is unfavourable to him. (Trib. App. Zagazig, 4 March 1902; No. 66, I, p. 56).

٢ 2° If a person is ordered by the Court to render an account by a certain date and after that date to pay a specified sum of money per day until the account is rendered, his appeal against the latter part of the judgment will be rejected for lack of interest, since it lies within the power of the Tribunal of First Instance to exempt the losing party from the payment of the above-mentioned sums of money on his showing good and sufficient cause for delay. (App. 27 November 1902; No. 57, p. 53).

٣ 3° — v. Reconciliation (Procès-verbal of—); Taxing order.

The setting aside of appeal proceedings (C.C.C.Pr. 124) involves the setting aside of the notice of appeal; it follows, therefore, that the appellant can only serve a second notice of appeal, if the time for appealing has not yet expired. (Trib. App. Assiout, 7 January 1902; No. 41 I, p. 35.)

v. Recidive, 2°.

v. Incidental claim.

١ 1° If the last day of the time allowed for appeal from a criminal judgment falls on a holiday the appeal may be made on the day following. (Cass. 13 June 1903; No. 103, p. 85).

٢ 2° A notice of appeal may be held to have been served out of time and the appeal in consequence rejected in form, even though no document can be found in the dossier determining the exact date of the service of the judgment appealed against, if it can with certainty be shown from the proceedings that the notice of appeal was in fact out of time. In particular, if, after the setting aside of the proceedings on appeal, the legal limit of time has elapsed between the setting aside and the service of a second notice of appeal, it is clear that the latter is out of time, the service of the judgment having necessarily preceded the setting aside of the appeal proceedings. (Trib. Assiout, 7 January 1902; No. 41, II, p. 35).

٣ 3° The time allowed for appeal begins to run from the date of the service of the judgment as against the party on whom the judgment is served but not as against the party serving it. (Trib. App. Zagazig, 4 March 1902; No. 66, II, p. 56).

٤ 4° The general principles of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure are applicable in criminal cases in the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The service, therefore, of a criminal judgment by default upon the father of the condemned person during the latter's absence from their common domicile is valid, and consequently his appeal after the expiration of the time allowed by law should be rejected. (Trib. App. Kena, 30 June 1902; No. 75, p. 64).

٥ 5° v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 7°; Retroactive effect of laws.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 4°, 5°, 10°, 13°; Complicity 2°.

v. Bar regulations.

v. Juristic personality.

v. Theft (Attempt).

The rules concerning the exercise of the profession of barrister are rules of public policy. A Court, therefore, is bound to declare void, even of its own motion, any fictitious assignment of claim made with the object of allowing the assignee to practise as a barrister in breach of the provisions relating to such practice. (Sum. Trib. Sohag, 21 March 1903; No. 110, p. 87).

v. Theft, 1°.

v. Sale by licitation.

v. Dieh.

v. Cassation (Substantial nullity of judgment), 4°, 5°, 10°, 13°.

v. Lease (Cancellation of).

v. Appeal (Time for), 1°; Complicity; Continuing offence; False pretences; File (Order to—); Forgery, 1°; Judgment by default on opposition; Police supervision, 1°; Recidive, 1°; Res judicata, 1°.

١ 1° Where several persons are condemned by the same judgment a ground of cassation urged by one benefits the others, if the ground is common to all. The nullity of the judgment is such a common ground. Such a case does not come within the meaning of Art. 221 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Cass. 26 October 1901; No. 1, II, p. 1).

٢ 2° Where there are several persons condemned by the same judgment a ground of cassation urged by one benefits the others if such grounds are common to all. The nullity of the judgment or the fact that the act is not punishable by the law are such common grounds. (Cass. 2 November 1901; No. 3, II, p. 2).

٣ 3° When a judgment of conviction has been appealed against by the accused and confirmed in its entirety, the Parquet can have no interest in attacking the appeal judgment before the Court of Cassation on the ground that the appeal of the accused was out of time and therefore inadmissible. For, if the appeal judgment were quashed, the judgment of first instance, identical with it, would ipso facto be re-established. The Parquet's demand for cassation must, therefore, be rejected. (Cass. 13 December 1902; No. 40, p. 35).

٤ 4° Where several individuals have recourse to the Court of Cassation the grounds adopted by some of them can benefit the others only if these grounds are general in character, if the judgment attacked is final and if those who did not adopt them presented others which were formally admissible. (Cass. 10 January 1903; No. 79, p. 69.)